Many firms own links of production chains-i.e., they own both upstream and downstream plants in vertically linked industries. We use broad-based yet detailed data from the economy's goods-producing sectors to investigate the reasons for such vertical ownership. It does not appear that vertical ownership is usually used to facilitate transfers of goods along the production chain, as is often presumed. Shipments from firms' upstream units to their downstream units are surprisingly low, relative to both the firms' total upstream production and their downstream needs. Roughly one-third of upstream plants report no shipments to their firms' downstream units. Half ship less than three percent of their output internally. We do find that manufacturing plants in vertical ownership structures have high measures of "type" (productivity, size, and capital intensity). These patterns primarily reflect selective sorting of high plant types into large firms; once we account for firm size, vertical structure per se matters much less. We propose an alternative explanation for vertical ownership that is consistent with these results. Namely, that rather than moderating goods transfers down production chains, it instead allows more efficient transfers of intangible inputs (e.g., managerial oversight) within the firm. We document some suggestive evidence of this mechanism.
I. Introduction
Firms often own links of production chains. That is, they operate both upstream and downstream units, where the upstream plant operates in an industry that makes an input for the downstream plant's industry. We explore the reasons for such ownership using two detailed and comprehensive data sets on ownership structure, production, and shipment patterns throughout broad swaths of the U.S. economy.
We find that most vertical ownership does not appear to be primarily concerned with facilitating physical goods movements along a production chain within the firm, as is commonly operations, and these plants also tend to be quite large. We will discuss this further below.)
These small shares are robust to a number of choices we made about the sample, how vertical links are defined, and whether we measure internal shares as a percentage of the firm's upstream production or its downstream use of the product.
This result raises a puzzle. If firms don't own upstream and downstream units so the former can provide intermediate materials inputs for the latter, why do they own them?
Certainly, much of the literature on vertical integration-stretching back to the landmark paper by Coase (1937) , with other notable later contributions like Stigler (1951) , and Grossman and Hart (1986) -couches firms' motives for integrating in terms of facilitating movement of products along a production chain.
The size of the literature precludes comprehensive citation. Surveys include Perry (1989) , Salop (1998) , Joskow (2005) , and Lafontaine and Slade (2007) . Much of the recent industrial organization research on integration has focused on foreclosure (market power) implications. Examples of recent theoretical and empirical work with broader views of the determinants of integration within and across industries include Antras (2003) , Acemoglu, Aghion, Griffith, and Zilibotti (2004) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2005) .
(Of course, in some contexts like hotel or business services franchising, vertical integration often does not involve transfers of physical goods. Our paper, however, focuses on vertically integration and shipments in the goods-producing sectors of the economy, like manufacturing. Our view is that a fair reading of the parables and case studies in the vertical integration literature would imply that many, if not most, researchers would consider moderating physical goods transactions a key motive for vertical ownership.)
We propose an alternative explanation that is consistent with small amounts of shipments within vertically structured firms-and even with an absence of internal shipments altogether.
Namely, we surmise that the primary purpose of ownership is to mediate efficient transfers of intangible inputs within firms. Managerial oversight and planning strike us as important types of such intangibles, but these need not be involved. Other possibilities include marketing and sales know-how, but any information-based input might be transferred readily across upstream and downstream units.
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That vertical integration is often about transfers of intangible inputs rather than physical ones may seem unusual at first glance. However, as observed by Arrow (1975) and Teece (1982) , it is precisely in the transfer of nonphysical knowledge inputs that the market, with its associated contractual framework, is mostly likely to fail to be a viable substitute for the firm.
This, of course, does not preclude integration from also involving physical input transfers in some cases. Indeed, we find a small number of plants that are clearly dedicated producers for their firms' downstream production units. However, these are the exception rather than the rule.
Thus, it appears that the "make-or-buy" decision (at least referring to physical inputs) can explain only a fraction of the vertical ownership structures we observe in the economy.
We also find other patterns in the data that are consistent with the intangible inputs explanation. We document that plants in vertical ownership structures have higher productivity levels, are larger, and are more capital intensive than other plants in their industries. We go on to show that these disparities, which we interpret as embodying fundamental differences in plant "type," primarily reflect persistent differences in plants that are started by or brought into firms with vertical structures. In other words, while there are some modest changes in plants' type measures upon integration, most of the cross sectional differences reflect selection on preexisting heterogeneity. Second, controlling for firm size explains most of these type differences.
That is, plants of similarly-sized firms have similar types, regardless of whether their firm is structured vertically, horizontally, or as a conglomerate.
These patterns evoke the equilibrium assignment view of firm organization advanced by Lucas (1978) , Rosen (1982) , and more recently by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Garicano and Hubbard (2007) . To the extent that intangibles are complementary to the physical inputs involved in making vertically linked products, equilibrium assignment typically entails the allocation of higher-type intangible inputs to higher-type plants in each product category. If plant size is restricted by physical scale constraints, better intangible inputs will also be shared across a larger number of plants.
Simply put, higher-quality intangible inputs (e.g., the best managers) are spread across a greater set of productive assets. Some of these assets can be vertically linked plants, but their vertical linkage need not necessarily imply the transfer of physical goods among them.
Furthermore, there may not be anything special about vertical structures per se. The evidence below suggests that firm size, not structure, is the primary reflection of input quality. Larger firms just happen to be more likely to contain vertically linked plants.
In this way, vertical expansion by a firm may not be altogether different than horizontal The upshot is that the assignment view of the firm is consistent with large firms composed of high-type plants operating (often) in several lines of business. Common ownership allows the firm to efficiently move intangible inputs across its production units. Many of these units will be vertically related, making these segments "vertical" in that the firm owns each end of a link in a production chain. But the chain need not exist for the purpose of moderating the flow of physical products along it.
This scenario is consistent with the evidence we document in the paper, and in particular with our primary result about the lack of goods shipments within vertically structured firms. The remainder of the paper lays out the evidence and tests the hypothesis in more detail. It is organized as follows. The next section gives an overview of the two data sources we use in the paper. We then explain in Section III how we use them to measure vertical integration and shipments internal and external to vertical chains within firms. Section IV reports the empirical results. Section V discusses our proposed explanation for the results in more detail. We conclude in Section VI.
II. Data
We use microdata from two sources: the U.S. Economic Census, and the Commodity Flow Survey. We discuss each dataset in turn.
Economic Census. The Economic Census (EC) is an establishment-level census that is conducted every five years, in years ending in either a "2" or a "7". Establishments are unique locations where economic activity takes place, like stores in the retail sector, warehouses in wholesale, offices in business services, and factories in manufacturing. Our sample uses establishments from the 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997 For each shipment, the originating establishment is observed, as well as its destination ZIP code (exports report the port of exit along with a separate entry indicating the shipment as an export), the commodity, the mode(s) of transportation, and the dollar value and weight of the shipment.
Shipments in the survey are defined as "an individual movement of commodities from an establishment to a customer or to another location in the originating company." The CFS takes a random sample of an establishment's shipments in each of four weeks during the year, one in each quarter. The sample generally includes 20-40 shipments per week, though establishments with fewer than 40 shipments during the survey week simply report all of them.
We use the microdata from the 1993 and 1997 CFS; the former contains roughly 120,000 establishments and 11 million shipments, and the latter 60,000 establishments and 5.5 million shipments. As with the Economic Census, each establishment has an identification number denoting the firm that owns it. Both the establishment and the firm numbers are comparable to those in the EC, so we can merge data from the two sources. We match the 1993 CFS to the 1992 EC; this will inevitably lead to some mismeasurement of ownership patterns, but we expect this will be small given the modest annual rates at which plants are bought and sold by firms.
III. Measuring Vertical Ownership and Shipments within Firms' Production Chains
This section explains how we use the Economic Census and the Commodity Flow Survey microdata to measure key inputs in our analysis: which businesses are vertically integrated, and whether the shipments of such establishments are used within their firm or sent to external buyers.
The first step in determining which businesses are in vertical ownership structures is to ascertain the industry affiliation of every establishment in the Economic Census. We use the 1987 Input-Output Industry Classification System, the taxonomy used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for constructing the Benchmark Input-Output tables. Within the manufacturing sector especially, this system closely mimics the SIC 4-digit system, though there is some aggregation of SIC industries, and more rarely, SIC industries are split among inputoutput (I-O) industries. Aggregation is more common outside of manufacturing. 5 While the EC data does not contain establishments' I-O industry classifications, it does contain their SIC codes, so reclassification is straightforward using the BEA's published concordance.
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The next step is identifying in which industries firms operate. The Economic Census microdata contains owning-firm identification numbers for virtually every plant in the nonfarm private sector, which makes it easy to observe the industries in which a firm owns establishments. One limitation of our data is that only one owner is assigned to each establishment (in the EC, the owner is the legal entity that the Internal Revenue Service considers responsible for the payroll tax; essentially it is an Employer Identification Number). If other firms have partial ownership of establishments, we do not see it. 5 The SIC industries that are aggregated in the input-output taxonomy are typically those that sell different outputs to a "final demand" sector (e.g., personal consumption expenditures or gross private fixed investment) and use similar intermediate materials inputs and production processes. The input-output classification system is primarily concerned with intermediate goods and services transfers, so it places less importance on distinguishing products that vary only from the standpoint of final demanders. Since we share the focus on within-production-chain transfers here as well, the input-output classification system is appropriate for our analysis. One of the largest such aggregations in the 1987 input-output system, in terms of the number of industries involved, is industry 180400, "apparel made from purchased materials." This one input-output industry consists of the 23 four-digit SIC industries in 231x-238x. These SIC industries use similar inputs and production processes to make various apparel products primarily for personal consumption. Examples include industries like "mens' and boys' neckwear," "women's, misses', and juniors' dresses," and "robes and dressing gowns."
6 A given plant is assigned to a unique industry. Some plants do produce final products that fall under different four-digit SIC industries, however. The Census Bureau classifies such plants based on their primary product (almost always the product accounting for the largest share of revenue).
We next determine if a firm owns establishments in industry pairs on both ends of a substantial link in a vertical production chain. We define a "substantial link" as existing between vertical production chain, these plants are not considered vertically integrated simply because the firm owns some plants that are. This distinction will be preserved in most of the empirical work below, though a few necessary exceptions will be noted. 7 We use the 1987 tables. Given that the I-O structure of the economy is fairly stable over time, we do not expect those intertemporal differences in vertical commodity flows that we miss by using a single table over our whole sample to have a large impact. The five-percent cutoff used to define substantial vertical links is of course arbitrary. We have checked our major findings using ten-and even fifty-percent cutoffs and found few differences (the overall level of integration is of course lower in these more stringent cases).
To classify shipments in the Commodity Flow Survey from vertically integrated establishments as internal or external to the firm, we first must merge the CFS and EC data. This can be done straightforwardly using the two datasets' common establishment and firm identifiers. We then find the CFS establishments that we know from the EC data are in vertically integrated structures (determined as above), and furthermore, are on the upstream end of production chains within their firm. Whether or not an establishment is on the upstream end of a production chain is determined using the Input- If the destination ZIP matches any of the downstream establishments' ZIP codes, we classify the shipment as internal to the firm. 8 The CFS contains shipment-specific sample weights that indicate how many actual shipments in the population each sampled shipments represents. We use these weights when computing the shares of internal shipments (be it by count, dollar value, or weight).
IV. Empirical Results
8 Notice that we do not require that the shipment be destined to an establishment that is in an industry directly downstream to the shipping establishment, only that the destination be a plant that is on the downstream end of any vertical link in a firm. For instance, suppose a firm has two upstream establishments U 1 and U 2 , and two downstream establishments D 1 and D 2 , and U 1 -D 1 and U 2 -D 2 are separate vertical links. We would classify a shipment from U 1 as internal if it is destined to either D 1 or D 2 's ZIP codes, not just D 1 's. In this way, we are being liberal in defining internal shipments. Furthermore, because we only see destination ZIP codes, we are also assuming that a shipment to downstream establishment's ZIP code is indeed sent to that establishment rather than one outside the firm in the same ZIP code. This again will lead us to overstate the fraction of internal shipments (though likely only slightly, since in many industries, it is unlikely that there will be more than one establishment in a particular ZIP code). One factor leading to understatement, on the other hand, is that the EC is missing ZIP codes for about 10 percent of establishments. Therefore, intra-firm shipments to establishments for which we do not have ZIP codes will be misclassified as external. If these ZIP codes are randomly missing-there is no indication otherwise-then we can quantify the bias: internal shipments would be about 10 percent higher than reported. We further explore below many other measurement issues with classifying internal versus external shipments.
We begin by looking at the patterns of shipments within firms' vertical links. The exception to this general pattern is the small set of establishments that are clearly dedicated to serving the downstream needs of their firm. These are the 2.1 percent of the sample that report only internal shipments. The unusualness of this specialization is even more apparent in the histogram of plants' internal shipment shares shown in Figure 1 , panel A. The histogram echoes the quantiles reported above: the vast majority of upstream plants make few internal transfers. The fractions of establishments fall essentially monotonically as internal shipment shares rise-until the cluster of internally dedicated establishments. While not apparent in the histogram, another factor in the unusualness of these internal specialist plants is that they are larger on average. This, along with the internal share distribution being highly skewed, explain why the aggregate internal share of upstream plants' shipments (the across-plant sum of internal shipments divided by the across-plant sum of total shipments) is 19 percent. This is well above the median share across plants. Thus internal shipments are more important on a dollar-weighted than an ownership-decision-weighted basis, but are the exception in either case.
These results imply the traditional view that firms choose to own plants in upstream industries to control input supplies may be off target. Clearly other motivations for ownership must apply for those plants making no internal shipments. Even for those that do serve their own firm, though, their typically small internal shipments shares suggest that this role may not be primary.
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B. Robustness Checks
The level of the disconnect-at least in terms of physical goods transfers-between the upstream plants and their downstream partners is stark. We conduct several checks on the robustness of the result.
First, it is appropriate to review some details of how the Commodity Flow Survey is conducted, specifically with regard to its ability to capture intra-firm transfers. The CFS definitely seeks to measure them, and it makes no distinction between intra-and inter-firm transfers in its definition of "shipment." In fact, the survey instructions (U.S. Census Bureau (1997)) state explicitly that respondents should report shipments "to another location of your company," save for incidental items like "inter-office memos, payroll checks, business correspondence, etc."
There are several reasons to believe the implied shipments totals are accurate. First, the Census Bureau audits responses by comparing the establishment's implied annual value of shipments from the CFS with that from other sources. If the disparity is well beyond statistical variance, the Bureau contacts the respondent and reviews the responses for accuracy. If integrated establishments were systematically underreporting internal shipments because of confusion or by not following directions, the auditing process would help catch this.
Second, most establishments do report some internal shipments, indicating that they have not interpreted the definition of shipments as precluding intra-firm transfers. This is also reflected in the small share of establishments that report nothing but internal shipments.
Moreover, there is no mechanical reason why we should find the bump up in internal shipment shares near one, as seen in Figure 1 . We take this as further evidence of survey takers' comprehension of the CFS instructions.
Finally, for CFS establishments in the manufacturing sector, we can compare their implied annual shipments (the weighted sum of their sample shipments using the shipmentspecific sample weights included in the CFS) to the same plants' reported values of shipments from the Census of Manufactures (CM). These two shipments totals are reported on separate survey instruments, and often by different individuals at the plant. We find a strong correlation between them. The correlation coefficient between plants' logged shipments from the CM and the CFS is 0.85 across our matched sample of 15,043 plant-years, and a regression of the former on the latter yields a coefficient of 0.973 (s.e. = 0.004).
B.1. Robustness: Sample
In our first series of robustness checks, we consider the impact of modifications to our core sample of upstream vertically integrated plants. The corresponding distributions of establishments' internal shipments are shown in Table 4 , panel B. Each row is a separate check.
We show only the distributions of the dollar value shares for the sake of brevity; similar patterns are observed in the shares by shipment counts or total weight.
The first robustness check uses only establishments reporting at least the median number of shipments across all establishments in the sample. The point is to exclude those for which sampling error could be higher and for whom extreme values like zero are more likely. This leaves us with a sample of 15,161 establishment-years making just under 1.9 million shipments.
(This is greater than half the establishment-years in the benchmark sample because several plants report exactly the median number of shipments.) The results are in the first row of panel B.
Extreme values are in fact rarer in this sample: 29.4 percent report making no internal shipments, down from 34 percent in the full sample, and 0.7 percent report exclusively internal shipments, down from 2.1 percent. The remainder of the distribution is not much different, however. The median fraction of internal shipments is 3.9 percent (3.1 percent by value or weight), and the 90 th percentile establishment is less likely to ship internally than that in the full sample, with just under half of shipments being intra-firm.
The second check drops any establishment that reports any shipments for export. In the CFS, the destination ZIP code of shipments for export is for the port of exit, with a separate note indicating the shipment's export status and its destination country. Thus internal shipments to a firm's overseas locations would be misclassified as outside the firm, unless by chance the firm has a downstream establishment in the port's ZIP code. Focusing on the 21,219 establishments reporting no exports among their roughly 2 million shipments avoids this potential mismeasurement. The results are in the second row of panel B of Table 4 . The entire distribution is close to the benchmark results above, with the median internal share being 2.7 percent and 35.7 percent of establishments reporting zero intra-firm shipments. Missing export destinations are not the source of our results.
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The next check drops all wholesale establishments from the sample. internal shipments, lower than in the entire sample, and the fraction that are completely internally specialized is higher, at 2.7 percent.
The fourth check counts shipments destined for the ZIP code of any plant in the firm as internal, not just those going to locations of downstream links of vertical chains. It is possible that some vertical production may occur outside those chains we identify using the Input-Output tables. Some may even occur within a given industry, when a particularly complex production process is broken up across multiple establishments. Here, we are taking the broadest possible view toward shipments that represent intra-firm transfers of physical goods along a production chain. As seen in row 4 of panel B, all quantiles involve internal shipment fractions higher than 11 We will discuss below how the fraction of international trade that is within firms could be so much larger than the intra-firm domestic trade we document here. While internal shares are of course higher, it has the same shape as the benchmark distribution in panel A.
In the fifth check we make the generous assumption that a shipment is internal if it goes to any county in which the firm has a downstream establishment. While unrealistic, this approach accounts for almost any problems with ZIP code reporting errors or missing ZIP codes.
The results of this exercise are in row 5 of panel B. Not surprisingly, the shares of shipments considered intra-firm are considerably higher, given the easier criterion for being defined as internal. There are more internal specialists or near-specialists: the 90 th percentile internal share is 96 percent, and 6.3 percent of establishments have all of their reported shipments being internal. Even so, a substantial fraction of establishments-17 percent, more than twice the number of internal specialists-report no shipments to counties where downstream plants in their firms are located. The median internal share across plants is 28 percent.
The sixth check restricts the sample to plants in the twenty-five manufacturing industries with the least amount of product differentiation, as measured by the Gollop and Monahan (1991) index of product differentiation. The concern is that even the detailed Input-Output industry classification scheme may be too coarse to capture the true extant vertical links. For instance, it might be that while two industries are substantially linked at an aggregate level, this actually reflects the presence of (say) two separate vertical links within a six-digit I-O industry. In this case, we wouldn't expect many shipments to go from upstream plants in one link to downstream plants in another, even though we might infer the two are vertically linked just from comparing the industry-level trade patters. By selecting industries with undifferentiated products, we hope to remove most of the product heterogeneity within detailed I-O industries, raising the probability that the industry-level links in the I-O table hold at a disaggregate level. There are 1216 plant-years in this subset of industries in the CFS. We find that median internal shipment shares are higher for these plants at 6.1 percent, but the right tail is actually less internally focused; the 90 th percentile plant's internal share is 39.3 percent.
The remaining of the first set of robustness checks explore the impact of varying the five All in all, our benchmark results appear robust to several sample and variable construction changes.
B.2. Robustness: Is Geographic Closeness Important?
It's quite likely that some of the low internal shares we see above arise because a firm's plants are too spatially separated to make internal shipments practical. Of course, if this is the case, this may be a result as much a cause of the lack of within-firm goods transfers along a production chain. If moving physical products down a production chain was the only reason for vertical ownership, after all, no firm would own vertically related plants that were located too far from one another to make intra-firm shipments impractical. The fact that firms do own vertically linked producers that are far apart suggests other motives for ownership.
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Nevertheless, it is interesting to quantify how much distance matters. We take two approaches. The first is to compute the distribution of internal shipment shares for firms whose plants are all located close to one another. The second is to compare plants' shipment distances to the distances they are from other plants in their firms.
To see shipment patterns of closely-spaced firms, we use the subset of upstream plants from our CFS sample where all of the plants that their firm owns are in the same county. (This is determined from the Economic Census, which includes state and county codes for virtually all establishments. This location information is not subject to the limitations of the EC ZIP code data, where codes for 10 percent of plants are missing.) This subset is small-680 plant-years and 60,847 shipments-and contains a large number of two-plant firms with one upstream and 12 Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007) document examples of vertically integrated cement and concrete firms that own clusters of ready-mixed concrete plants that are remotely located from their upstream cement plants. These firms, in fact, do not internally supply these clusters with cement. The downstream concrete plants report instead buying cement in the local market from the firm's upstream competitors. We find evidence that the firms' motives for owning these concrete plant clusters is to harness logistical efficiencies in a business that shares a common final demand sector (construction) with cement.
downstream plant each. Nevertheless, it offers a rough gauge the role of distance. We can decompose these contributions to the pooled numbers by looking within plants.
We find that for 18.2 percent of upstream shipment plants, their farthest-traveling shipment does not go as far as the distance to the nearest downstream plant in their firm. These plants account for just over half of the one-third of our upstream plants that report no internal shipments, showing the importance of distance. But this also means the other half of plants reporting no internal shipments do send output at least as far as their nearest plant. This pattern isn't unusual across the broader sample. Looking across plants, the average of the within-plant medians of reported shipment distances is 256 miles, while the average distance to the closest downstream plant within the firm is 242 miles.
B.3. Robustness: Accounting for Actual Downstream Use
We measure internal shipments above as an upstream plant's internal shipments as a share of its total shipments. There are cases where this ratio might be misleading as to the extent of intra-firm product movements. Consider a hypothetical copper products company with two plants: an upstream mill that produces copper billets, and a downstream plant that processes billets into pipe. Suppose the downstream plant needs $10 million of billets to operate at capacity. Now say the upstream mill produced $100 million of billets in a year. If the mill shipped $10 million of billets to the pipe-making plant and the remaining $90 million elsewhere, we would compute its internal shipment share as 10 percent. Yet the firm would be completely supplying its downstream needs internally. The difference in the scales of operations upstream and downstream creates this misleading internal share.
Like the geographic closeness issue above, such patterns may be a result, rather than a cause, of low internal shipments within firms' vertical ownership structures. Nevertheless, in this section we take firms' upstream and downstream magnitudes of operation as given and create an alternative measure of internal shipment shares.
Instead of using upstream plants' total shipments as the denominator in the internal shipment share measure, we instead calculate (in ways described below) firms' downstream use of products they make upstream. We then construct internal shipments shares as intra-firm shipments of upstream plants divided by the minimum of two values, either the firm's total upstream shipments (similar to what we do above), or the firm's reported downstream use of the upstream product. Hence the internal share of the hypothetical copper firm above would be 100%, rather than 10% as before, since the firm completely provides all the copper it uses downstream.
While the CFS offers a random sample of establishments' shipments, we unfortunately do not have a random sample of establishments' incoming materials. This precludes us from directly measuring "internal purchase shares" in the same way as we measure internal shipment shares. But we can, for a subset of firms, construct internal shipments as a fraction of downstream use. To do so, we must first restrict our CFS sample. For our purposes here, we need to see all the upstream shipments of a firm, at least for a given product. The results from these exercises are shown in Table 2 . Recall that we now compute 13 There are two measurement problems with this first approach that will tend to bias our internal shares measures in opposite directions. First, because we only required that we observe all of a firm's plants making a particular product in the CFS, we might be missing internal shipments from firms' other upstream plants (this is much less of a problem in our other two downstream use measures below, since they are matched by firm-product, rather than just by firm). This will cause us to understate the true internal shipment share. The second measurement issue arises because we can only observe materials purchases for downstream establishments in the manufacturing sector. If some upstream products are used in the firms' non-manufacturing establishments, we will not include these in our downstream usage measures. This will lead us to overstate internal shipment shares. As a practical matter, both of these measurement concerns are probably second-order. Our restricted sample has a large fraction of firms with only a few establishments, so if a firm's upstream plant(s) is in the CFS and its downstream plant(s) in manufacturing, chances are those are all the plants the firm owns. One thing to note about the results is that some shares are above one. It is possible that this reflects in part the fact that some of the upstream plants' shipments that we classified as internal because their destination ZIP code was where the firm owned a downstream plant in fact went to a plant outside the firm in the same ZIP code. But probably some of these shares reflect measurement error in firms' downstream materials use (because it is outside the manufacturing sector and we can't observe it, for instance). A summary measure of the extent of such measurement error is the fraction of observations with implied internal usage ratios above one.
For the three downstream use measures above, these shares are 5.3, 11.3, and 16.7 percent, respectively.
Thus the small internal shares we were finding before do not seem to be simply reflecting the fact that most integrated structures have considerably larger upstream plant scales than downstream. In fact, we still find a large number of cases (over one-third of the sample) without any intra-firm shipments. In other words, we know a firm makes a particular product upstream, uses that same product as an input downstream, but does not ship any of its own upstream output to its downstream units.
B.4. Robustness: Is There Vertical Integration Within Plants?
Our definition of vertically integrated ownership links requires multiple plants by definition. A firm must own at least one plant each in vertically related upstream and downstream industries. This definition could be problematic if firms commonly vertically integrate production within a single plant. In such cases, the firm would be operating a vertically integrated production process and obviously supplying its own input needs. We would miss this type of integration, however, because we would not classify the plant as integrated. There would be no shipments from the upstream to downstream parts of the production process in the CFS, since those goods transfers never leave the plant.
To give a concrete example, consider the two following hypothetical firms. One has two plants. The upstream plant refines copper ore into billets which are then shipped to the downstream plant to be extruded into pipe. The second firm operates a similar production process in a single plant: one side refines ore into billets, and the other side turns billets into pipe.
We would define the former plants as vertically integrated, but not the latter, even though each firm operates the same production processes. Manufactures materials supplement. The second plant, where billet production is inside the plant, will list copper ore as a materials purchase. Hence if we see substantial differences in materials use patterns across plants (in the same industry) that we classify respectively as vertically linked or not, we should be concerned that we are missing a lot of vertical production that occurs "under one roof." On the other hand, a lack of significant differences suggests this sort of misclassification is less of a concern.
We make three such comparisons between the materials use patterns of what we classify as vertically linked plants and others in their industry. (Again our analysis is restricted to plants in the manufacturing sector because of the detailed intermediate materials data requirements.)
We first compute the share of each plant's intermediate materials purchases that is for "raw materials," which we define as the products of the agricultural, fisheries, forestry, or mining sectors-i.e., SIC product codes beginning with "14" or below. We then regress this share on a set of industry-year fixed effects and an indicator equal to one if we classify the plant as in a vertical ownership link. In essence, we test whether there are significant differences in the intensity of raw materials use across plants that we classify as vertical and non-vertical in the same industry. We would expect that if the "under one roof" misclassification problem were substantial, we would find that plants we designate as non-vertical would have a larger raw materials share, since a greater portion of the production chain would be operated within the plant. Again, to return to our example, the pipe plant in the second firm reports copper ore (a raw material) as a materials purchase, while the plant in the first firm purchases copper billets.
We run this regression on a sample of over 484 thousand plant-years from the Census of industry. Further, the point estimate of the share difference is small, less than one-twentieth the average raw materials share of 8.0 percent, and of the wrong sign (recall that we would expect plants we classify as vertically linked to use raw materials less intensively). Even if we restrict our comparisons only to those roughly 87,000 plants that report using positive raw materials shares, the vertically linked coefficient is 0.13 percent with a 0.18 percent standard error.
Our second check aggregates this raw materials use data to the industry level. We add up raw and total materials use of plants classified as vertical within an industry year, and compare the ratio of the two to the same share computed for non-vertical (again, under our classification) plants in the same industry. We then conduct a t-test for equality of means across our sample of 1714 industry-years. The mean difference is 0.09 percent, with a standard error of 0.16 percent.
Again, there are no significant within-industry differences in raw materials usage intensity across the two types of plants.
Our final check is also done at the industry-year level. We separately aggregate materials purchases of our designated vertical and non-vertical plants for each industry year. We then order materials by decreasing intensity of use for each type of plant (as measured by their aggregate share of purchases). This yields 73,668 industry-year-materials ranks for both vertical and non-vertical plants. We then compare these ranks within industry-year to see if there are systematic differences. The two ranks move together; the correlation coefficient is 0.73. Table 3 shows the frequency of relative rank orderings for the five most intensively used materials by industries' non-vertical plants. (Material 1 is the most intensively used.) Only ranks 1-7 of vertical plants are shown for parsimony. If materials usage patterns were exactly the same, we would only see entries on the diagonal of the table. The most intensively used material of an industry's vertical plants would be the most intensively used among its non-vertical plants; the second-most used would be so for both types of plants, and so on. Clearly, this is not the case.
However, the general pattern holds. The diagonal is the largest element of a row or column, and the frequency of other pairings falls as they move further away from the diagonal. Hence these results suggest, as do the raw materials use tests above, that there are not systematic differences in the mix of materials used by plants we classify as in vertical ownership links and those we do not classify as such.
B.5. Robustness: Changes in Shipment Patterns upon Vertical Ownership
Some plants are in both the 1993 and 1997 CFS samples, so we can observe changes in shipment patterns over time for a small panel of plants. We use this panel to see if becoming part of a vertical ownership structure is associated with notable changes in shipment patterns. We select establishments that are in both the 1993 and 1997 CFS and that are not in vertical ownership structures in 1993. This yields a sample that is just shy of 12,500 plant-year observations. (Note that this sample necessarily includes plants outside of our benchmark sample of upstream establishments above.) We then regress several shipment patterns metrics for these plants on a set of plant fixed effects, an indicator for 1997, and an indictor for a plant in a vertical ownership structure (this can only be equal to one in 1997 by our sample selection criteria). This will show us whether plants that become vertically structured by 1997 see systematically different changes in shipment patterns than those remaining outside of vertical ownership links.
The results are shown in Table 4 , panel A. We look at five metrics, each computed at the plant level (we take logs of each except the last): the average dollar value per shipment, average weight per shipment, average miles per shipment, the average dollar value per pound of shipments, and the number of destination ZIP codes to which a plant sends shipments divided by the total number of shipments a plant makes (a measure of the location dispersion of a plant's shipments). There are significant changes in all of the metrics except average value per pound across the entire sample, as indicated by the coefficient on the 1997 dummy. However, the changes are systematically different for establishments that are brought into vertical ownership structure only for, curiously, the value per pound of shipments. This possibly reflects a change in the product mix or a quality shift in output within products, though we can't say for sure.
There is no indication that plants start shipping to fewer (or more) destinations when they become part of a vertical ownership link.
We look more closely at the destinations of plants' shipments and their changes in panel B of Table 4 . Here, we focus on those plants in our CFS panel that become part of vertical ownership structures; this includes 903 plants observed in each of two years. We make the following comparison. We first find all ZIP codes to which the plants make internal shipments 
C. Plants in Vertical Ownership Structures are High "Type" Plants
It appears that the lack of movement of goods along production chains within most vertically structured firms is a robust feature of the data. As mentioned above, we propose that vertical ownership is instead typically used to facilitate movements of intangible inputs like management oversight across a firm's production units. We begin in this section to document additional facts that are consistent with this theory.
We first focus on plant-level measures of "type." We conceptualize plants' types as combinations of idiosyncratic demand and supply fundamentals that affect plant profitability.
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We use four such measures in our empirical work. They are not independent, but they differ enough in construction to allow us to gauge the consistency (or lack thereof) of our results.
Two are productivity measures. Both measure plant output using the plant's reported sales deflated by a price index for the plant's four-digit SIC industry. The productivity metrics differ in their measure of inputs. One is output per worker-hour and the other total factor productivity.
(Both are expressed as the log of the plant's output-input ratio.) Our third type measure is simply the plant's scale as measured by logged real revenue. The fourth metric is the plant's logged capital-labor ratio (capital stock per worker-hour). Further details on the construction of these measures are in the Data Appendix. Because of data limitations, we can only construct these measures for the roughly 350,000 plants in each year's Census of Manufactuers.
In industry equilibrium, these fundamentals are tied to plant observables like productivity, size, and (in some cases) factor intensities.
These empirical type measures have been shown in various empirical studies to be correlated with plant survival. Survival probabilities reflect plant type in many models of industry dynamics with heterogeneous producers, like Jovanovic (1982) , Hopenhayn (1992) , Ericson and Pakes (1995) , and Melitz (2003) . The productivity-survival link has perhaps been the most extensively studied empirically; see Bartelsman and Doms (2000) for a recent review of this literature. Plant scale and survival was the subject of much of Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) , and capital intensity's connection to survival was explored in Doms, Dunne, and Roberts (1995) .
We first compare plant type measures across integrated an unintegrated producers by regressing plant types on an indicator for plants' integration status and a set of industry-by-year fixed effects. The coefficient on the indicator (which takes the value of one for vertically integrated plants and zero otherwise) captures the average difference between plants in and out of vertical ownership structures. By including fixed effects, we are identifying type differences across plants in the same industry-year, avoiding confounding productivity, scale, or factor intensity differences across industries and time. We estimate this specification for each of the four plant type proxies and report the results in Table 5 , panel A. A natural question that follows from these results is the causal nature of vertically linked plants' type differences. There are three possibilities, and they are not mutually exclusive. The results, which are in panel C of Table 5 , make it clear that soon-to-be integrated plants are different from other unintegrated plants in their industry. They are more productive; their labor productivity advantage is over 20 percent and they have about three percent higher TFP levels. They are also considerably larger and more capital intensive. (Here, as with the capital intensity comparisons above, integrated or to-be-integrated plants have considerably higher levels of both capital stocks and labor hours than unintegrated plants. It is simply that the capital gap is even larger than the labor gap.) Moreover, these differences are slightly smaller than the gaps measured above, but are still of a similar order of magnitude.
Finally, we investigate if becoming part of a vertical ownership structure is associated with unusually high growth in productivity, scale, or factor intensities. We compare changes in these values (computed as five-year differences between ECs) for plants that become vertically integrated to changes over the same period for industry plants remaining unintegrated.
Operationally, we regress the growth in plants' type proxies on an indicator dummy for plants that become part of integrated production chains. We again include a full set of industry-year fixed effects to account for industry-specific growth patterns. We must restrict the sample here to continuing plants-i.e., those in both the current and prior ECs-that are not vertically owned in the prior EC.
The results are shown in panel D of Table 5 . Becoming vertically part of a vertical structure is associated with four to five percent higher labor productivity growth than for continuing plants that remain unintegrated. Despite faster labor productivity growth, however, there are no statistically significant differences in TFP growth, and the point estimate is actually negative. This divergence between labor and total factor productivity growth reflects the fact that integrating plants see increases in capital intensity over those that stay unintegrated. This relative capital deepening raises the productivity of labor inputs but not the plants' overall factorneutral efficiency. (We will see below that this capital deepening occurs because the plant experiences both growth in capital and declines in labor.) Interestingly, plants that become integrated do not grow significantly faster than their industry counterparts that remain unintegrated.
Comparing the type disparities in panels B, C, and D to those seen across all plants in panel A suggest that much of the heterogeneity between plants in and out of vertical ownership structures reflects the effect of differences in the assignment of plant types to integration status.
That is, vertically integrated plants are more productive, larger, and more capital intensive primarily because they were either born into integrated structures that way, or because those are the types of unintegrated plants that firms merge into integrated structures. What gaps not accounted for by these underlying differences are closed due to the faster growth in labor productivity, size, and capital intensity experienced by existing plants when they become integrated.
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D. Firm Size and Plant Type Differences
Plants in vertical ownership structures are different. This naturally leads to the question of whether firms with vertical structures are different. Figure 2 plots the densities of firm size (logged total employment, since revenue is unavailable outside of manufacturing) for three mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets of multi-establishment firms. One set includes firms with vertical ownership structures. 18 The other two multi-unit organizational structures are singleindustry and multi-industry-unintegrated firms. The former are multi-establishment firms that own plants in only one industry. The latter are firms that own establishments in multiple industries, but none of which comprise substantial vertical links as defined above.
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The figure reveals that each of the (logged) employment size distributions is unimodal, though they clearly have different central tendencies.
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17 These are of course general patterns across the hundreds of manufacturing industries in our sample. These broad patterns do not imply that the relative importance of these sources of type differences doesn't vary across individual industries. It is quite possible that in certain industries most of the type differences reflect changes that occur when plants become integrated rather than pre-existing type dissimilarities.
Single-industry multi-unit firms are the smallest and have the most symmetric size distribution. Vertically integrated firms are clearly the largest on average, and their distribution is more skewed than the other firm types. (While not plotted, single-establishment firms are smaller than the multi-unit single-industry firms, as one might expect.) Thus not only are vertically integrated plants larger, their firms are as well.
Given that firms with vertical structures tend to be the largest, it's natural to ask whether the differences in plant types seen above simply reflect underlying differences in firms. That is, if large firms tend to own systematically larger (and more productive, etc.) plants, this might explain the distinctive type patterns of plants in vertical structures, rather than their vertical ownership linkages per se. That is, perhaps the high types of plants in vertical ownership structures are a function of firm size rather than firm structure.
To see if this is the case, we rerun the plant type regressions above while including controls for firm size. We regress plant type measures on an indictor for vertically integrated plants and industry-year dummies as above, while now adding flexible controls for firm size.
These controls are quintics of logged firm employment, the firm's logged number of establishments, and the logged number of industries in which the firm operates. We restrict the sample here to plants owned by multi-unit firms (the same sample whose firm size distributions are discussed above), but few differences are seen if single-establishment firms are also included.
In effect, this specification lets us compare plants in the same industry that are in firms of the same size, regardless of the firms' internal structures.
The results of these regressions are in Table 6 . Once we control fully for firm size, much of the correlation between a plant's type and its vertical ownership structure goes away. Indeed, if anything, vertical plants have slightly lower TFP and output levels than others in their industry owned by similarly sized firms. This is a particularly striking result given the enormous average plant size difference between vertical and non-vertical plants documented above. Two type "premia" remain after we control for firm size: labor productivity and capital intensity. Each is on the order of four percent, a fraction of the initial 35 and 45 percent differences.
Hence, much of what makes plants in vertical ownership structures different isn't really related to vertical ownership itself, but rather the facts that the largest plants tend to be in the largest firms, and the largest firms tend to own vertically linked plants. Once this is accounted for, their TFP and output leads disappear and only relatively small differences in labor productivity and capital intensity remain.
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V. Discussion
We documented several facts about plants in vertical ownership structures. First, raising the primary puzzle of our inquiry, we find that most shipments from upstream plants in vertically structured firms do not stay within the firm. The vast majority of such plants ship either nothing or only very small fractions of their output to downstream units in their firm. This result, which is robust to a number of measurement approaches, is not in accordance with the common presumption that vertical ownership is used to facilitate the movement of goods along a production chain within a firm.
Second, we show that a plant that is part of a vertical ownership has higher levels of several plant type measures than others plants in its industry. These differences primarily reflect persistent dissimilarities existing either at plant birth (if born into a vertical structure) or before the plant becomes part of an integrated firm. Changes that happen when an unintegrated plant becomes part of a vertical link within a firm play a smaller role. However, we also find that most of the observed type differences are not related to plants' vertical ownership structure.
Rather, they reflect the fact that vertical plants tend to be in large firms, and large firms of all organizational forms have high-type plants.
While the first set of results is not consistent with vertical ownership (typically) being used to facilitate the movement of physical inputs along a production chain, we propose that the second set of results offers insight into an alternative explanation: namely, that vertical ownership allows efficient intra-firm transfers of intangible inputs. Managerial oversight and planning strike us as among the most important of these intangibles, but marketing/sales knowhow or other information goods can also be readily transferred among integrated establishments in a firm. We discuss this alternative here.
The results that vertically integrated plants have different "types"-but that those differences are largely explained by firm size rather than structure-are consistent with theories of the firm as the outcome of an assignment mechanism. These models, like Lucas (1978) , Rosen (1982) , and more recently by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Garicano and Hubbard (2007) imply assortative matching in the presence of complementarities among inputs.
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Note that if this alternative explanation for vertical ownership is correct, the distinction between "downstream" and "upstream" becomes one of convenience rather than an accurate depiction of intra-firm transfers. Managerial, marketing, or other similar inputs are just as likely to be transferred from a firm's downstream units to its upstream ones as the reverse. The names reflect the flow of the physical production process, which may be nonexistent or otherwise very small; they do not necessarily indicate the flow of inputs within the firm.
That is, higher-quality intangible inputs (e.g., better managers) are spread across better and/or a greater number of production units. The highest-quality intangible inputs are allocated to multiple establishments in distinct product categories ( Firms will occasionally expand into these lines under the expectation that their current capabilities will prove useful in the new markets. Transfers of managerial and other non- 22 These models are in turn built on foundations laid out earlier by Koopmans ' (1951) and Becker (1973) . tangible inputs will be made to the new establishments, yet no physical good transfers from upstream to downstream establishments need occur.
A. Additional Evidence the Vertical Structures Facilitate Intangible Input Transfers
While we were able to check the robustness of our results above in many ways, we do not have the best data for testing our "intangible input" explanation for vertical ownership structures.
Ideally, we would have information on the application of managerial or other intangible inputs (like managers' time-use patterns across the different business units of the firm). This would let us see the flows of information-based inputs within a firm and how they change with firm structure, just as we can now with physical goods in the CFS. Unfortunately, we do not have such data, and it almost surely does not exist for the breadth of industries which we are looking at here. That said, we briefly take a few approaches at garnering evidence in this section, though we stress that it is only suggestive.
We first look at the internal shipment patterns of a very select group of establishments in vertical ownership structures. Specifically, these are newly vertically integrated establishments on the upstream end of a production chain (not just newly integrated, in fact, but newly multiunit plants-they were single-unit firms in the previous Economic Census). They have also been bought by firms that, concurrent with the purchase, begin owning plants in a vertical production chain for the first time. That is, these are the establishments that make these firms vertically structured. We expect that these establishments might provide one of the clearest windows into the reasons why firms expand vertically. Because of the narrow selection definition, the number of these establishments in the CFS is small-a total of 622 establishment-years, reporting 58,622
shipments-but the subsample still offers enough leverage to make a meaningful comparison to the overall patterns discussed above.
The results for this group of establishments indicate the prevalence of internal shipments is even lower for this group than for the entire sample. The median fraction of internal shipments is 0.4 percent, and 46 percent report no internal shipments at all. Because the small sample raises questions of whether these differences are statistically significant, we also conduct regression comparisons that project plants' intra-firm shipment shares on an indicator for these new-VI establishment/firm units and full set of industry-year dummies. The estimated coefficient on the subsample indicator in the dollar-value-share regressions is -0.035 (s.e. = 0.009). (The coefficient is also significantly negative when shares of shipment counts or weights are used as the dependent variable.) Thus these establishments do in fact have significantly lower internal shipments shares.
These results indicate that even for establishments that expressly bought as part of a firm's move to build a vertically integrated ownership structure, internal sourcing of physical inputs is not widespread practice, also consistent with other motives playing an important, and perhaps dominant, role driving the integration decision.
Our second test digs deeper into the changes seen in plants that become vertically integrated, as with those observed in panel D of Table 5 . We saw there that the only significant changes in type measures observed for such plants were in labor productivity and capital intensity. (These are also the only two significant differences that remain between integrated and nonintegrated plants in the cross section once we fully control for firm size.) It's not surprising that these two measures are positively correlated; higher capital intensity implies more output per unit labor in any production technology where capital and labor are complements.
We decompose these changes into changes in their respective components by repeating the exercises in Table 2 , panel D, but this time running the specifications separately for plants'
capital stocks and labor stocks. So we can exactly decompose these changes, we restrict the sample to sets of plants for which we observe each of the production measures. This way, the changes in the ratios' (logged) components will add to the change in ratios. Furthermore, for reasons that will become clear momentarily, we look at the individual changes in two types of labor inputs: production and nonproduction workers. The results are shown in Table 7 .
The 4.8 percent labor productivity growth in this sample is driven both by a 2.4 percent increase in output (unlike the sample as a whole, which saw no significant change) and by an equally sized decline in hours. The increase in capital intensity is sourced in both a dose of investment-capital stocks in newly vertical establishments grow 6.7 percent faster than they do in plants in the same industries that remained unintegrated-and through the same 2.4 percent decrease in labor inputs.
What is most interesting about this change in labor inputs is the change in labor composition that accompanies it. Nonproduction worker counts fall more than do production workers; in fact, the change in the latter is not statistically significant. If we also look at the share of nonproduction workers in the plants' total employment, this also falls significantly when the plant becomes vertically integrated.
These changes in capital intensity and labor composition are consistent with an intangible inputs motive for vertical ownership. Capital intensity would rise upon a plant becoming part of a vertical link if skilled managerial or other intangible inputs have stronger complementarities with capital than labor, for example. This would be expected in the allocation mechanism we discuss above.
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The results in this section, as we discussed above, are only suggestive. We cannot observe workers' positions within the firm at any finer level than the production/nonproduction worker dichotomy, and would need much more detailed information on managerial or other intangible inputs to test the theory convincingly. Still, we find the results an intriguing starting point for continued work.
As for the labor composition effect, the relative decline in nonproduction workers upon integration is consistent with some of the plant's former management, marketing, sales, or any staff associated with providing intangible inputs, being replaced with the new intangible inputs of the vertically integrated structure. Fewer workers are needed to provide these new inputs in the integrated structure because of centralization and scale returns and/or higher efficacy.
VI. Conclusion
We have used data on millions of plants, the organizational structure of firms that own them, and their shipments, to explore production behavior in vertical ownership structures. We find that the common view of vertical ownership supporting efficient intra-firm transfers of goods along a production chain may not be its primary purpose. Firms' upstream plants ship only a fraction (and often none) of their output to downstream units inside the firm. This finding is robust to a number of measurement methods. Thus, outside of some exceptional plants that we find are clearly dedicated to internal production, most vertical ownership appears to have a different motive.
Motivated by patterns we document in plants' "types" within and across firms, we propose an alternative explanation for vertical integration. Namely, that it facilitates efficient 23 Firms with vertical ownership structures might also face lower effective capital costs, which would shift their optimal factor allocation toward a more capital-intensive orientation. Since we know vertical firms are larger on average, and there is evidence that larger firms might be less credit constrained (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (forthcoming) ), this is a plausible alternative.
transfers of intangible inputs (e.g., managerial oversight) within firms. It is plausible that the market would have a more difficult time mediating transfers of knowledge inputs than of physical goods. Unfortunately, the data only allow enough leverage to gather suggestive, rather than conclusive, evidence on this point.
Note that if this explanation is correct, there may not be anything particular about vertical structure within firms; intangible inputs can flow in any direction across a firm's production units. Vertical firm structures and expansions may not be fundamentally different from horizontal structures and expansions. Instead, a more generalized view of firm organization, like the firm as an outcome of a assignment mechanism that matches heterogeneous tangible and intangible inputs, may be warranted, and is consistent with some of the other patterns we document in the data.
One interesting point of comparison between our findings and the existing literature is with regard to international trade flows. For countries where such data is available, intra-firm trade accounts for roughly one-third of international goods shipments (see, e.g., Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007) ). This is clearly substantially larger than the modest, domestic within-firm shipment volume we document here. A possible explanation might be that multinational firms are more likely to be comprised of the types of plants at the right tail of our Total Factor Productivity. We measure productivity using a standard total factor productivity index. Plant TFP is its logged output minus a weighted sum of its logged labor, capital, materials, and energy inputs. Harper, Berndt, and Wood (1989) .
The total productive capital stock k it is the sum of the equipment and structures stocks. This is divided by the plants' number of labor hours to obtain the capital-intensity measure used in the empirical tests. Notes: This table shows, for the sample of plants in both the 1993 and 1997 CFS that were not part of vertical ownership structures in 1993 but were by 1997, quantiles of the distribution of these plants' "internal" shipments. These are defined in 1993 as those to ZIP codes that will be internal in 1997-i.e., ZIP codes where the plant's firm will own a downstream plant in 1997). In 1997 these are the standard measure of shipments to ZIP codes where the firm currently owns a downstream plant. 
